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Stuck on the Rubicon? The Resonance of Ideas of Demoi-cracy in Media 
Debates 
ABSTRACT: Theories of demoi-cracy have recently gained salience in the continuous debate 
on a legitimate democratic Euro-polity. Demoi-crats argue that multiple demoi can provide 
the European Union (EU) with its much sought after democratic legitimacy. This paper aims 
to offer an empirical contribution to the literature on the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy. The 
paper analyses media debates in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France in order to 
identify resonance of demoi-cracy ideas. Analytical-content analysis was undertaken of 
legitimation statements in opinion articles in two quality newspapers per country and shows 
that the debates often share a similar point of departure as demoi-cratic theories. However, the 
evaluation of both this situation and the existing EU-structures relies on either 
intergovernmental or supranational democratic idea(l)s. In conclusion, the research offers 
little evidence of ideas of demoi-cracy resonating in these public debates on the EU’s 
legitimacy with a few promising exceptions.  
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They are bound instead by the basic injunction of demoicracy: thou shalt not cross the 
Rubicon which separates a Union rules by and for multiple demoi from a union ruled by and 
for one single demos.  On this ship, many yearn to land on one shore or the other rather than 
stay on the Rubicon. 
(Nicolaïdis 2013: 367) 
The EU’s legitimacy has been a source of continuous public and academic debate 
over the past decades. Since the early 1990s, the ‘permissive consensus’ has arguably come to 
an end (Hooghe and Marks 2009), witnessed in mong other in a decline in voter turnout and 
acts of resistance against the EU-regime (e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Bellamy and 
Attucci 2009: 198-99; Føllesdal 2006: 442): the so-called Post-Maastricht blues (Eichenberg 
and Dalton 2007).
i
 The analysis is often that the EU has more autonomous powers then 
before, however it lacks the necessary democratic legitimacy: the democratic deficit. The 
academic debate has been exploring many different dimensions of the EU’s legitimacy. 
Different concepts, means, and objects of legitimacy feature in the literature (see e.g. Bellamy 
and Castiglione 2003; Føllesdal 2006; Wimmel 2007), yet the debate on the EU’s legitimacy 
persists.  
Theories of demoi-cracy offer a fruitful perspective on the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy. In contrast to the widespread concern about the lack of a European demos – i.e. 
the no-demos thesis (Scharpf 1999) –, they argue that the existence of multiple demoi and a 
single democratic kratos within the Euro-polity does not necessarily result in a democratic 
deficit (Nicolaïdis 2013: 352-53). Instead, so some demoi-crats argue, the EU can be 
considered legitimate, because there is equality and interaction of the statespeoples’ and the 
EU-citizens’ representatives as well as a balance between supranational rights of EU-citizens 
and national policy autonomy (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 348). However, this 
normative-theoretical perspective on the EU’s democratic legitimacy warrants further 
empirical exploration.  
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This paper explores whether the idea of the EU as a demoi-cracy resonates in the 
public debates on the EU’s legitimacy in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France. 
Thus, it aims to explore the empirical basis for the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy. The 
findings indicate that the public debates in these three countries often subscribe to the analysis 
of the existence of a multiple demoi and a single kratos. However, this is understood as the 
source of the EU’s democratic deficit. The solution is not found in a balance and/or 
combination of legitimation by the national demoi and EU-citizenry. This perspective is 
nearly completely absent from the debates. Instead, two democratic ideas of legitimacy – 
intergovernmental and supranational – compete with one another. In conclusion, the idea of 
the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy finds, at least for now, little resonance in these public 
debates, which, in the main, still depend upon democratic ideas despite a few promising 
exceptions.  
The paper proceeds as follows: first, it will present an overview of the literature on 
the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy. Then, the research strategy will be discussed in the 
second section. In the third section, the findings will be presented in relation to the two-fold 
argument of demoi-cratic theories. That is, first, the desirability of multiple demoi and a 
single kratos, and then, secondly, the attainment of legitimacy through a balance and 
combination of national and transnational modes of legitimation. Finally, the paper will 
conclude with a summary, limitations, and recommendations for future research. 
 
Theorization of the EU as a Legitimate Demoi-cracy  
 The literature on the EU as a demoi-cracy can often be associated with political-
theoretical debates on the nature of the Euro-polity. Since the 1990s, there has been a move 
toward a more normative research agenda in EU-studies: the normative turn (Bellamy and 
Castiglione 2003). The ‘theorem of the democratic deficit’ has been the catalyst for many 
normative political-theoretical reflections on the Euro-polity (Friese and Wagner 2002: 342). 
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The literature on a legitimate democratic Euro-polity posits idea(l)s in order to determine 
appropriate standards of democratic legitimacy. Some of the more prominent positions in this 
debate include the EU as a technocracy (Majone 1999; Scharpf 1999), a federal state (Morgan 
2005), a civic republic (Bellamy and Castiglione 1999; Habermas 2001), and an 
intergovernmental regime (Moravcsik 2002). However, as Bellamy and Attuci observe, there 
is as of yet no consensus on the normative question at the heart of this debate (2009: 218). 
Despite or maybe thanks to this lack of consensus, the debate on the appropriate standards for 
the EU’s legitimacy persists. The EU as a demoi-cracy forms a promising contribution to this 
academic debate (Müller 2011).  
Demoi-cratic theories on the EU’s legitimacy tend to offer a two-part argument. 
Many authors have contributed to the theorization of the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy (a.o. 
Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Besson 2006; Bohman 2004, 2005; Cheneval 2011; Cheneval 
and Schimmelfennig 2013; Müller 2011; Nicolaïdis 2003, 2013; Weiler 1999). Despite their 
differences (Nicolaïdis 2013: 352-58), their arguments tend to share a two-part structure. 
First, they argue that European integration constitutes a transformation of the European 
political landscape. The Euro-polity constitutes a single political authority – kratos – without 
a single political community – demos – instead with multiple national communities – the 
demoi. This largely empirical analysis is evaluated positively. Secondly, they argue in favour 
of new principles of legitimacy for the regime in this newly emerging polity rather than a 
transposition of the standard democratic ones (Nicolaïdis 2013: 352). These principles need to 
secure equality as well as interaction between both the statespeoples’ and the EU-citizens’ 
representatives and in terms of balancing citizens’ supranational rights and national policy-
making autonomy (Cheneval et al. Forthcoming). Thus, the demoi-cratic argument unfolds 
from a more descriptive-empirical analysis to a normative account of demoi-cratic legitimacy. 
The argument is fleshed out further to fully appreciate it.
ii 
 
The demoi-cratic argument on the EU starts from the recognition of the Euro-polity’s  
‘dual character’ as simultaneously a collection of states and a citizenry within a common 
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supranational regime (Nicolaïdis 2013: 354). However, it also denies the impossibility of 
legitimate democratic politics under these conditions. Demoi-crats agree that European 
integration constitutes a transformation of the European political landscape. The Euro-polity 
emerges as a polity with a regime with authoritative powers, but it lacks a single European 
demos instead national demoi are likely to persist in the near future. Empirical evidence 
informs and bolsters these claims (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 337-39).  
Theories of demoi-cracy embrace the EU’s dual character (Cheneval et al. 
Forthcoming: 335; Nicolaïdis 2013: 352-53). Two important considerations lead to the 
embrace. First, the existence of transnational effects of national policies warrants a 
transnational regime, because democratic peoples should work together in order to address 
their negative externalities (Weiler 1999: 341). Secondly, the normative desirability of the 
concept of the people is challenged for excluding outsiders. Demoi-cracy might therefore be a 
more desirable form of democratic governance than democracy (Cheneval et al. Forthcoming; 
Weiler 1999). A theory on the appropriate standards on the EU’s democratic legitimacy 
should therefore embrace the existence of multiple demoi and a single kratos (Bellamy and 
Castiglione 2013: 207; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 335; Nicolaïdis 2013: 357).  
The second part of the argument focuses on criteria and potential ways to 
democratically legitimate the EU as a demoi-cracy. Most demoi-crats agree the EU-regime is 
not a state (Nicolaïdis 2013: 354).
iii
 Still, demoi-crats offer somewhat different perspectives 
on the EU-governance regime. Some (Bohman 2004; Nicolaïdis 2003, 2013)
 
conceptualize 
legitimacy for multiple potentially overlapping constituencies within a ‘multi-perspectival’ 
governance regime. For example, the Eurozone and the CAP are governance regimes with 
their own competences ruling over partially overlapping, yet different constituents. 
Alternatively, others approach the European governance regime from the perspective of a 
single kratos – the EU –, that is simultaneously not a state, but still performs statist functions 
that require legitimation (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 
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2013; Weiler 1999: 348). Still, they agree that demoi-cracy should represent a third way 
between sovereign states and federal state (Nicolaïdis 2013: 353-56).  
The demoi-cratic literature suggests ways to incorporate demoi in policy-making 
processes in order to legitimate the EU-kratos. A demoi-cratically legitimate EU should 
accommodate ‘an opening up’ of the national demoi (Nicolaïdis 2013: 356). Opening up 
refers both to active interaction between national demoi and the creation of alternative 
transnational demoi, such as stakeholder groups (Nicolaïdis 2013: 355-56). Demoi should 
have ways to influence transnational policy without fear of domination by others and in 
recognition of each other (Nicolaïdis 2013: 358-60). The EU’s legitimacy could, for example, 
be improved through the supranational institutionalization of Member States’ parliaments – 
the representatives of the national demoi – in a ‘Senate’ (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013). This 
would offer a forum for statespeoples’ representatives to influence policy. 
Demoi-crats seek to involve both representatives of national demoi and citizens 
within the EU-regime. A broad demoi-cratic criterion able to assess the EU’s legitimacy is 
“the equality and interaction of citizens’ and statespeoples’ representatives in the making of 
common policies [and balancing of] transnational rights of citizens with national policy-
making autonomy” (Cheneval et al. Forthcoming: 1). The active participation of these 
representatives – such as states, national parliaments, and stakeholder groups – ultimately 
legitimates the EU as a demoi-cracy. Some demoi-crats conclude that the EU actually 
performs well judged upon this demoi-cratic criterion of legitimacy (Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013: 14). Yet the EU’s legitimacy crisis seems to persist. Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis suggests that the explanation lies in the persistence of the paradigm of democracy 
predicated on a single demos (2013). However, does the idea of the EU as a demoi-cracy 
developed from empirical observations find no resonance at all in the public debates on the 
EU’s legitimacy? 
 
 7 
A Comparative Analysis of Media Debates 
This paper aims to offer an initial exploration of the resonance of ideas of the EU as a 
demoi-cracy through an examination of media debates on its legitimacy. Two kinds of 
perspectives can be distinguished in the assessment of the EU’s legitimacy: external and 
internal (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Hurrelmann 2008: 191). An external perspective on 
legitimacy evaluates the EU’s legitimacy against normative standards from a ‘third person’ 
point of view, whilst the internal perspective inquires into the beliefs on the EU’s legitimacy 
held by the EU-citizenry. Demoi-cratic theories on the EU’s legitimacy offer an external 
perspective. However, the internal perspective of demoi-cratic legitimacy warrants further 
exploration (Cheneval et al. Forthcoming: 2). This research offers an empirical contribution to 
this still largely theoretical literature on the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy.  
Public debates are a well-established practice to analyse the EU’s legitimacy from an 
internal perspective. Mass media outlets have become an important object of analysis for 
empirical research into the EU’s internal legitimacy (e.g. Bursens and Baetens 2005; 
Hawkins 2012; Hurrelmann 2008; Liebert and Trentz 2008; Medrano 2009). The following 
research analyses statements on the EU’s legitimacy in articles from quality newspapers. 
Newspapers tend to offer more space to explicate positions in more detail than other mass 
media outlets. Quality newspapers were selected specifically in virtue of their tendency to 
produce more opinion pieces than other newspapers. These pieces are particularly well suited 
for in-depth qualitative analysis (Hawkins 2012; Hurrelmann 2008). While, these articles do 
represent an elite part of the debate, the aim to establish resonance of a set of ideas rather than 
to reconstruct the entire public debate.
iv
 Furthermore, if these ideas do not resonate in these 
debates then they are unlikely to resonate in other parts of the public debate. These reasons 
inform this empirical focus. 
The lack of a European public sphere necessitates selecting national debates.
v
 The 
research inquires into the public debates of the Netherlands (NL), the United Kingdom (UK), 
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and France (Fr). A random selection is not favourable within the context of the EU 
(Haverland 2005: 2). These countries were selected for the differences in the perception of the 
EU. The United Kingdom is a well-documented Euro-sceptic country, whilst the Netherlands 
and France are usually categorised as pro-European. Moreover, the referenda on the 
constitutional treaty increased the salience of the EU’s legitimacy in these pro-European 
countries. These differences lead to an expectation of diversity in the perspectives on the 
EU’s legitimacy allowing for a comparison between debates and a greater potential for the 
resonance of demoi-cratic ideas. One might expect more original ideas, such as demoi-cracy, 
to resonate more pro-European debates (NL & Fr) than in Euro-sceptic ones (UK), because 
the former expected to attempt to legitimate the EU, whilst the latter expected content with 
the lack of legitimacy. 
A comparative analytical-content analysis of legitimation statements was undertaken. 
This analytical-content analysis follows a similar approach to earlier research (Hurrelmann 
2008: 195-97; Hurrelmann et al. 2012: 3-4). The objects of analysis are legitimation 
statements. A legitimation statement is an explicit evaluative statement on the EU’s overall 
legitimacy contributing to an ongoing political discourse (Hurrelmann et al. 2012: 3-4).
vi
 
These statements are the basic unit of analysis rather than the articles themselves. The content 
of a single statement on the EU’s legitimacy has become more significant than a mere 
mention in an article (Hurrelmann et al. 2012: 3). Moreover, the in-depth qualitative analysis 
of ideas of demoi-cracy requires the explication of the understanding of legitimacy. Hence, 
the analysis examines the content of legitimation statements. Further, triangulation secures 
proper interpretation through both a discourse analysis on the article level and secondary 
material.  
The Analytical Framework  
An analytical framework was developed to systematically code the statements. The 
framework offers a systematic way to code legitimation statements on the evaluation of the 
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EU’s legitimacy. It incorporates, in addition to whether evaluations are positive or negative, 
dimensions of legitimacy and modes of legitimacy. These categories represent prominent 
conceptualizations in the literature on EU’s democratic deficit. They were originally 
developed to test democratic legitimacy, however they are capable of establishing demoi-
cratic legitimacy. 
First, statements were coded according to whether or not they deem the EU to be 
legitimate. More specifically, the question was whether a statement evaluates the EU’s 
current legitimacy positively or negatively. A statement indicating a need for improvement is 
coded as negative, as it is take to indicate a potential to improve legitimacy. The statement 
need not argue that there is a complete absence of legitimacy. However, a lack of some kind 
of legitimacy is conceptually prior to the potential for improvement. A statement was coded 
as either positive or negative. The other two categories indicate the reasons for the EU’s 
legitimacy or lack thereof. 
Secondly, the framework distinguishes between three dimensions of legitimacy: 
input, throughput, and output. These dimensions have been explored in relation to the nation-
state (Bernard 2001) and the EU (Bekkers et al. 2007; Schmidt 2012; Wimmel 2007: 14-16). 
Input legitimacy refers to the civil and socio-political requirements for democratic 
participation (Wimmel 2007: 15). The category not only includes elections, institutions for 
representation, and public spheres, but also the bond of collectivity between citizens (White 
2011: 4-6). This latter factor combines shared values with a ‘national’ identity. Throughput 
legitimacy shifts the attention to decision-making procedures after the input-phase (Wimmel 
2007: 15). Legality and effectiveness can function as justifications of these procedures. 
Finally, output legitimacy focuses on the performance of a regime in serving its citizens 
(Scharpf 1999). The outcomes of the political process fall under this dimension. Statements 
were coded as input, throughput, or output.  
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Thirdly, the framework analyses the mode of legitimacy deemed necessary for the EU. The 
EU can be described as its predecessor – the EC – as “less than a federation, but more than a 
regime” (Wallace 1983). In terms of legitimacy, a federation has become associated with 
direct legitimacy. Direct legitimacy refers to direct acceptance by the citizens of a regime 
(Beetham and Lord 1998: 27). The EU is thus understood as an international regime depends 
for its legitimacy on its Member States: indirect legitimacy. Governments rather than the 
citizens confer legitimacy upon the regime (Beetham and Lord 1998: 27). Statements were 
coded as: direct, indirect, neither, or both. The ‘neither’-category tends to address the 
justification for European integration as a proxy for the EU’s legitimacy. Finally, the ‘both’ 
category refers to statements incorporating both modes of legitimacy.  
[Table 1: Coding Examples] 
Empirical Sources 
The following empirical sources were analysed. Two qualitative newspapers were 
selected per country: NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant for the Netherlands; The 
Independent and The Guardian for the United Kingdom; and Le Figaro and Libération for 
France. They represent different ideological positions. These were analysed during the run up 
to and aftermath of 1) the introduction of the Euro and 2) the referenda on the constitutional 
treaty in France and the Netherlands. The first period runs from 1st January 2000 until 1
st
 
January 2002; and the second period from 30
th
 May 2004 until 30
th
 May 2006.
vii
 These 
periods of a high degree of salience tend to generate more public debate; hence there is the 
expectation of a greater number of opinion pieces (Hurrelmann et al. 2012:6). 
Articles were pre-selected using electronic keyword searches in the database: 
Academic Nexus Lexus. The aim is to retrieve articles explicitly addressing the EU’s 
legitimacy. After a pilot study, the following keywords were selected and translated: 
legitimacy crisis; democratic deficit; future of the EU; future of Europe; Democratic Europe; 
sovereignty + EU. The articles were reviewed in order to avoid irrelevant ones and duplicates 
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on the criterion whether statements explicitly addressing the EU’s legitimacy were found. The 
number of articles and statements can be found in Table 2.  
[Table 2: Number of Articles and Statements] 
Finally, the following measures were taken to secure reliability of the research. The 
conceptual framework set out above disciplines the analysis. The qualitative nature of the 
research question does not allow for single word analysis. In line with Hurrelmann’s approach 
(2008: 208; fn. 5), to ensure reliability analysis was not delegated to non-experts, instead the 
author selected the articles and coded the statements according to the framework. This avoids 
the potential danger of inconsistency due to a degree of interpretation necessarily involved in 
research into ‘free-range’ statements in contrast to set-answers in questionnaires (Hurrelmann 
2008: 193). Decision rules and extensive note taking during the coding process further 
ensured consistency and ultimately reliability.  
 
Findings: One Prominent Problem, and Two Solutions 
The demoi-cratic literature creates two contrasting expectations.  First, the resonance 
of demoi-cratic ideas creates the expectation of a positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy 
(Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 348). Following this expectation, on the one hand, the 
lack of demos to provide direct legitimacy should not be understood as problematic, whilst, 
on the other hand, the combination of modes of legitimacy should result in demoi-cratic 
legitimation of the EU. Demoi-cratic statements, even if they do not refer to the term, could 
be democratic defenses of the status quo or institutional re-balancing as long as they do not 
aim toward intergovernmentalism or aiming to federalize the EU. Alternatively, the European 
institutionalisation of national parliaments could also be considered demoi-cratic (Bellamy 
and Castiglione 2013). The empirical reality according to this account reflects the theory of 
demoi-cracy, therefore, more broadly, one might expect demoi-cratic ideas to resonate in the 
debate. 
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Second, however, demoi-cratic theorists have been pessimistic about the expectation 
of resonance of the idea of the EU as a demoi-cracy (Nicolaïdis 2013: 367). The EU as a 
legitimate demoi-cracy would be a ‘mere’ academic construct. Instead, the idea of democracy 
predicated on a single people is expected to be prominent in the public discourse. The EU’s 
input would be prominent and problematic, and solutions would be sought in either indirect or 
direct modes of legitimacy. More concretely, statements favoring either supranational 
federalization or intergovernmentalism are considered democratic rather than demoi-cratic. 
This rather pessimistic account results in the expectation that although institutional reality 
might reflect demoi-cratic theory, these ideas will not be reflected in debates on the EU’s 
legitimacy. Thus, the literature leads to contrasting expectations with regard to the resonance 
of ideas of demoi-cracy in these debates. 
The findings indicate common tendencies across all debates on the resonance of 
demoi-cratic ideas, despite national particularities. Firstly, the research suggests that the EU 
has a legitimacy deficit from an internal perspective. Around 80% of all statements evaluated 
the EU’s legitimacy negatively. The Dutch debate is the most negative with 81,4% of all the 
statements offering a negative evaluation, followed by the French with 80,8%, and finally, the 
British with 79,8%. There is little change between the periods in this regard.
vii
 Other research 
collaborates this finding (Hurrelmann et al. 2012). It indicates a legitimacy deficit in line with 
most of the academic literature. This critical tendency might also be linked to the inherent 
nature of editorials. But this is unproblematic for the research, because the aim is not to 
reconstruct public debates. The question, however, is the resonance ideas of demoi-cracy in 
these debates, therefore patterns of legitimation are of interest rather than an overall tendency 
in the evaluation.  
The Problematisation of Multiple Demoi  
The reason for this legitimacy deficit tends to be sought in the existence of multiple 
national demoi. The no-demos thesis is a prominent analysis in the public debates. Input 
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legitimacy is the most prominent dimension in debates, which results in a legitimacy deficit. 
The prominent analysis in the debates is congruent with the no-demos thesis. Democratic 
legitimacy is often related to the need for a common ‘national’ identity. Federalists, Euro-
sceptics, and intergovernmentalists problematise the lack of a European demos albeit resulting 
in different conclusions and recommendations. 
The analysis of the dimension indicates the prominence of input legitimacy and a 
negative evaluation thereof. More than half the total statements address the input legitimacy 
in all three debates (NL: 64,6 %; UK: 58,8%; Fr: 52,4%). The output legitimacy comes 
second in all three (NL: 19,7%; UK: 26,2%; Fr: 31,5 %). Finally, the throughput component 
accounts for less than 20% in all three debates. The input legitimacy is persistently evaluated 
more negatively than the national average (NL: 89,4%; UK: 86,9%; Fr: 85,5%). By contrast, 
the output is evaluated much more positively (percentage of negative statements: NL: 48,5%; 
UK: 62,7%; Fr: 67,5%). The EU’s legitimacy is most often evaluated from a perspective that 
combines the input component with a direct model resulting in a negative evaluation. More 
than two fifths of the Dutch statements are of this type (44%), compared with about a third in 
the other debates (UK: 32,9%; Fr: 34,4%). These findings indicate a clear prominence of 
input legitimacy in the evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. Further, it tends to result in a 
legitimacy deficit.  
The no-demos thesis features prominently in the debates, as the pattern described 
above already indicates. Yet, the academic literature (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Habermas 
2001) and political discourse (European Council 2001) have tended to understand the EU’s 
legitimacy deficit as a democratic deficit. The argument is that the lack of legitimacy derives 
from a lack of popular participation, democratic representation, and a European public sphere. 
This understanding prevails in the Dutch and French debate, but it is less prominent in the 
British one – except for certain media biases. Still, commentators in favour of supranational 
democratisation do invoke the lack of a European people, but they believe democratisation 
will be instrumental in the creation of one. 
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The democracy and national identity are implicitly and explicitly related in many 
evaluations of input legitimacy. The EU’s legitimacy deficit is often understood to derive 
from institutions being ‘far away’ from or ‘foreign’ to citizens (e.g. Macintyre 2000). This 
analysis is that the EU is perceived as a technocratic bureaucracy influential upon, yet far 
removed from the EU-citizenry. The input deficit derives from a lack of identification (e.g 
Chevènement 2005). Attempts are made to convince the public of a European value 
community (e.g. Brinkhorst and Bolkenstein 2005; Balkenende 2005). Other statements 
depend upon its existence, such as cultural arguments against the membership of Turkey (e.g. 
Bollaert, Germon and Lacroix 2005; See also Medrano 2009: 88; van Middelaar 2009). 
Despite Habermas’ normative appeals against it (e.g. 1996), a French quote exemplifies the 
understanding of a close-knit relationship between democracy and national identity: 
But regardless of the magicians. The room is empty, but they [European federalists] continue 
their magic tricks in front of a virtual European people. Because there is no European people, 
but only peoples in Europe, rooted in national histories, language, culture, policies, attached to 
what we call a nation where democracy is exercised and where identity is based, which is 
manifested in sovereignty (Gallo 2005). 
The lack of a European demos and persistent identification with national demoi is 
understood as an important challenge for the EU’s legitimacy across the debates.  
Demoi-cratic theorists share this analysis, but they do not problematise it. Yet, the 
expectation of a lack of demoi-cratic ideas seems validated for the elite discourse on the EU’s 
legitimacy. The next section will focus the proposed solutions to the EU’s legitimacy deficit. 
The demoi-cratic argument would translate in solutions combining modes of legitimacy. 
However, the prominent solutions will further validate the ‘second nature’ of democratic 
ideas (Nicolaïdis 2013: 362). 
The Perceived Solutions: A Competition between Two Democratic Ideas 
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 The legitimacy deficit does not result in appeals to demoi-cratic solutions. The 
solution to the EU’s legitimacy deficit is currently sought in solutions drawn from either 
intergovernmental or federalist ideas. These ideas lead to the perception of the EU-kratos as 
either an international organisation or a federal state (to-be). The findings suggest, instead of 
a balance or combination between modes of legitimacy, there tends to be an either-or 
competition between them in the public debates. Interestingly, intergovernmentalists do 
propose demoi-cratic solutions, however these are not self-aware demoi-cratic solutions. Yet, 
a mention could be understood as promising. 
Direct legitimacy tends to be the prominent mode in all three debates and it results 
often in a negative evaluation. The EU’s legitimacy is most often evaluated in relation to its 
direct legitimacy (NL: 63,3%; UK: 51,9%; Fr: 57,1%). The neither category (NL: 22,1%; 
UK: 23,3%; Fr: 25,6%) and indirect legitimacy (NL: 12,7%; UK: 22,9%; Fr: 16,2%) are 
much less common. Statements focussing on direct legitimacy lead most often to a negative 
evaluation in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in comparison to the nearest 
negative other model (NL: 87,3% versus 75,2% [neither]; and UK: 87,6% versus 73,5% 
[neither]). France forms an exception in this regard. Indirect legitimacy is also evaluated more 
negatively than the national average 87,1% (direct) and 83,5% (indirect). The analysis 
indicates that direct legitimacy is more prominent in the public debates.  
The idea of the EU as a novel regime is almost completely absent from the debates. 
Demoi-crats aim to establish principles of legitimacy for a novel democratic kratos. However, 
this idea is nearly completely absent from the public debates. A negligible percentage of 
statements combine both modes of legitimacy. An exception to the pattern is the then Dutch 
staatssecretaris of European Affairs, Dick Benschop, who attempts to legitimate the EU 
through the idea of Network Europe (Obbema 2001). However, this idea tends to be more 
associated with technocratic output rather than democratic input. Therefore, it does not 
necessarily resonate well with demoi-cratic ideas. Instead, the findings indicate a 
dichotomous conceptualisation of the EU as either intergovernmental regime or federal state 
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(to-be).
ix
 A Dutch article exemplifies this dichotomy: it presents the EU’s future as an either-
or choice between federal state or cooperation between states (Klamer and Magala 2001).  
The statements on the EU’s lack of direct legitimacy are actually made both by 
federalist and intergovernmentalist commentators. In the debates, federalists tend to argue 
that the EU lacks sufficient direct legitimacy, because its institutions have not yet developed 
into a full federal state or another form of federation. They understand the current EU-regime 
as an ‘in-between’-phase in an on-going process of supranational federal integration. The 
Euro-sceptics’ arguments depend on the same logic, but they want to resist this process. In 
this case, the desire  – not the underlying democratic ideas – determines their position. On the 
other hand, intergovernmentalists tend to perceive EU-institutions as ‘too democratised’ and 
‘institutionalised’. The EU’s direct legitimacy deficit is perceived as deriving not from 
institutional underdevelopment, but institutional overdevelopment. This evaluation is in turn 
linked to the lack of European people. Direct legitimacy tends to be evaluated negatively, 
because the EU-regime is neither a full federal state nor merely an intergovernmental one.  
Statements on the EU’s indirect legitimacy are less prominent, but tend to rely on 
similar ideas. Federalists believe that indirect legitimacy is insufficient or irrelevant; while 
Euro-sceptics argue that overly influential supranational institutions threaten it. Euro-sceptic 
intergovernmentalists (mainly in French) tend to share the latter concern with the Euro-
sceptics. The Euro-sceptic and pro-European intergovernmentalists disagreement in their 
evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy can to an extent be reduced to a clash in desires pace 
federalist and Euro-sceptics with regards to direct legitimacy. The intergovernmental idea is 
the same, but the desire to legitimate differs. The findings indicate that the positive evaluation 
of indirect legitimacy derives from a desire to legitimate. These intergovernmentalists do not 
seem to want to create a more federal regime any more than supranational federalists want to 
devolve to an intergovernmental one.  
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The demoi-cratic legitimacy does find some resonance with intergovernmentalists. 
The reliance on just indirect legitimacy is to some extent problematic for pro-European 
intergovernmentalists. Arguably, this is, in part, due to the fact that it attempts to solve a 
‘democratic deficit’ that does not actually derive from its perception of the EU as at its core 
an intergovernmental regime. The British Gaullists ascribing to Tony Blair’s positionx offer a 
particularly interesting solution from the perspective of demoi-cracy. Their proposal is the 
creation of a European Senate made up of national parliamentarians representing national 
constituencies in order to curtail EU-competences (Lichfield 2001). This demoi-cratic 
solution, however, is a compromise to intergovernmentalism rather than a self-aware move 
towards a European demoi-cracy. Actually, they tend to argue that the powerful position of 
the European Council secures democratic legitimacy (Macintyre 2000).  
Similarly, the so-called yellow card procedure features a few times in the Dutch 
debate during the second period.
xi
 For example, Andre Rouvout, Dutch politician of the Euro-
sceptic Christian-Union, defends its introduction despite the rejection of the Constitutional 
treaty in order to tame the EU (NRC, 2005). Important similarities to the UK are the sceptical 
perception of the Dutch audience in this period and an intergovernmental logic tending to 
inform these proposals. The only possible demoi-cratic exception might be former EU-
commissioner Frits Bolkenstein. He defends the treaty and supranational institutions, yet 
explicitly rejects the idea of a federal EU as unrealistic. However, his defence focuses on the 
status quo in relation to economic management, which is more output related (Brinkhorst and 
Bolkenstein 2005). Still, the idea of the EU as a demoi-cracy resonates in these proposals. 
These findings do not bode well for the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy, as demoi-
cratic principles find very little resonance in these debates. The EU’s legitimacy is not 
evaluated in relation to a combination between direct and indirect modes of legitimacy. On 
the contrary, neither intergovernmentalists nor federalists seek to balance in line with the 
second part of the demoi-cratic argument. These democrats argue for the necessity of a demos 
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on either the national (intergovernmental) or supra-national (federalist) level (Nicolaïdis 
2013: 354) resulting in a competition.  
Still, some demoi-cratic ideas are found in the public debates, such as a European 
Senate of national parliaments or the yellow card procedure. However, these ideas do not 
seem to derive from a self-aware demoi-cratic ideal. Thus, there is some resonance of the idea 
of the EU as a demoi-cracy, which can be understood as promising for an ‘academic 
construct’. Still, the external evaluation might be positive according to demoi-cratic ideals, 
but self-aware demoi-cratic idea(l)s do not resonate in the internal perspective on the EU’s 
legitimacy.  
 
Conclusion: Feeling stuck on the Rubicon 
The paper endeavoured to explore the resonance of ideas of demoi-cracy within three media 
debates on the EU’s legitimacy. This empirical research contributes to the largely political-
theoretical literature on the EU as a demoi-cracy. It inquires from an internal rather than an 
external perspective into the EU as a legitimate demoi-cracy. The research’s offers two 
important shared results in relation to the resonance of demoi-cratic ideas in these public 
debates, despite their stark difference.  
First, the findings indicate that the demoi-cratic analysis of the nature of the Euro-
polity as a kratos with multiple demoi, yet without a demos is prominent in these debates. 
However, this analysis tends to be problematised rather than embraced in the debates. 
Secondly, it is important to note that the solutions for the ‘democratic’ deficit are not found in 
the achievement of a balance or combination, but rather in the creation of a democratic 
federal state or retrenchment into a more intergovernmental structure. These two democratic 
logics tend to compete rather than complement one another. Therefore, the EU might well be 
demoi-cratically legitimate from an external perspective. However, ideas of demoi-cracy are 
largely absent from the internal perspective on the EU’s legitimacy in these elite debates.  
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Demoi-cratic ideas find some limited resonance. These ideas are reflected in 
institutional innovations, namely the idea of a Senate of parliaments and the yellow card 
procedure. Interestingly, in contrast to the expected country effect, it is found most often in 
the most Euro-sceptic country. An explanation might well be that federal solutions will be 
more acceptable within pro-European debates. Pro-European British contributors might be 
forced to be more inventive, hence demoi-cratic ideas tend to emerge in this Eurosceptic 
debate. The Dutch public became understood as more sceptical, which might provide a 
similar explanation for the emphasis on the yellow card procedure in the second period. 
However, the proposals tend to be understood as intergovernmental rather than demoi-cratic. 
The debates seem to confirm the expectation found in demoi-cratic literature on the 
persistence of democratic ideas. The research suggests that the debate lacks self-aware 
defenders of the EU as a demoi-cracy. Therefore, the state of affairs of the EU might be 
described from an external perspective as a (legitimate) demoi-cracy, but very little resonance 
is found from an internal perspective. To borrow Kalypso Nicolaïdis metaphor (2013: 367), 
the findings indicate a feeling of being “stuck on the Rubicon” rather than a celebration of 
such a status quo. The vocabulary of the democracy predicated on the existence of a ‘people’ 
seems indeed to have become ‘second nature’ (Nicolaïdis 2013: 367). The lack of self-aware 
demoi-crats might indicate that the demoi-cratic in-between state of the Euro-polity – to 
borrow a phrase – is an unlikely equilibrium (Marks et al. 1996: 372; Nicolaïdis 2013: 362), 
unlikely does not necessarily equate to ‘impossible’.  
 Finally, two potential limitations are worth noting; both of which could inform future 
empirical research into the EU’s demoi-cratic legitimacy. First, this research explores three 
public debates around the Euro-crisis and the constitution. These public debates might have 
evolved over time and other countries might possibly yield different results. For example, the 
yellow card procedure has been introduced, yet this need not mean actual acceptance from an 
internal perspective. Therefore, first of all, future research is recommended to analyse debates 
around more recent events, such as the Euro-crisis. Even though, some argue that this might 
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actually gave further impetus to democratic logics (Nicolaïdis 2013: 1). Another 
recommendation following from this limitation is to inquire into the public debates in other 
Member States.  
Second, the research inquired into public debates through opinion articles in quality 
newspaper. The contributors and readership of quality newspapers can be characterized as 
elites (Hurrelmann 2008: 194; Hurrelmann et al. 2012: 6). Therefore, even though these 
outlets might impact and reflect widely held opinions (e.g. Bruter 2003; Michailidou and 
Trentz 2013), one should be careful with any generalizations. Despite this obvious limitation, 
the advantage of focussing on more sophisticated elite opinion is the increased likelihood to 
find the relatively sophisticated ideas of demoi-cracy. The lack of resonance found might 
therefore be deemed more significant as a result. Future research, however, might endeavour 
to inquire into other mass media outlets or undertake other types of public opinion research 
into the EU’s demoi-cratic legitimacy from an internal perspective.  
[Appendix: Overall Overview Findings] 
Endnotes
 
i
 For a critique of this interpretation, see (Hurrelmann 2007). 
ii
 The following account draws primarily on Cheneval and Schimmelfennig (2013) and 
Nicolaïdis (2013), in addition to increasing coherence within this special issue, it provides a 
fruitful framework for this empirical inquiry.  
iii
 The no-state thesis is often associated with multi-level governance (e.g. Bache and Flinders 
2004; Marks et al. 1996), but also, for example, the EU as a neo-medieval empire (Marks 
2012; Zielonka 2006) or regional state (Schmidt 2004). 
iv 
Similar theoretical considerations inform the focus on elite debates in (Hurrelmann 2008: 
194; Hurrelmann et al. 2012: 6). 
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v
 A small scale European public sphere might be emerging (Díez Medrano 2009: 89-92). 
However, national public spheres persist as the primary site of public debate (Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013). 
vi 
The analysis focuses on explicitly evaluative subset of statements within political claims 
analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999). Other examples of this type of claims approach 
include: (Hurrelmann 2008, Hurrelmann et al. 2012; Stratham et al. 2010).  
vii
 The 30
th
 is the day between the French and Dutch referendum on the Constitutional treaty. 
viii
 The number of publications in France did increase from 17 to 58, which suggests an 
increase in importance of the EU’s legitimacy (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 8).  
ix
 Juan Díez Medrano distinguishes between intergovernmental and 
intergovernmental/supranational models (2009: 103). The debates tend not to reflect the 
second nuance as a model for legitimation. 
x
 ‘[Blair] is a modern Gaullist’ (Young 2001) and ‘"De Gaulle," [Blair] replied. "Top man"’ 
(Macintyre 2000). 
xi
 Officially, this early warning mechanism offers the ‘limited’ power to delay legislation to 
national parliaments. 
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Table 1: Examples of Coding 
Newspaper text  With [referenda] one offers citizens in Europe at last a possibility to 
influence at least a part of European politics. It has to be a robust 
instrument. Relatively easy to organise with observable outcomes, able to 
influence the rigid system (Versteegh 2004). 
Coding Input: referenda 
Direct: referenda on a European level 
Negative: needs to be introduced 
Newspaper text It is to lead the fight against today the "democratic deficit" of the 
European institutions and their governance, so that the peoples of Europe 
recover control of their common destiny (Bavay, et al. 2004). 
Coding Input: peoples control institutions and governance 
Indirect: peoples need to control their common destiny 
Negative: they have no control 
Newspaper text  He [Blair] takes wholly for granted, as his predecessors since then never 
did, the EU's essential role not only as a vehicle for enforcing the single 
market, but for tackling defence, crime, asylum and above all economic 
reform. (Macintyre 2000). 
Coding Output: tackling [problems] 
Indirect: Britain’s national interests 
Positive: He takes wholly for granted … the essential role 
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Table 2: Number of Articles and Statements 
Newspaper Articles 
Period 1 
Statements 
Period 1 
Articles 
Period 2 
Statements 
Period 2 
Articles 
Total 
Statements 
Total 
NRC Handelsblad 24 144 25 157 49 301 
Volkskrant 18 89 21 122 39 211 
The Independent 18 84 18 91 36 175 
The Guardian 22 122 19 123 41 245 
Le Figaro 13 86 31 220 44 306 
Libération 4 18 27 165 31 183 
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Appendix: Overall Overview Findings 
The Netherlands 
Pattern/Evaluation Positive Negative 
Input Neither 12 44 
 Direct 15 226 
 Indirect 6 22 
 Both 2 3 
Throughput Neither 4 23 
 Direct 1 39 
 Indirect 3 8 
 Both 0 2 
Output Neither 12 18 
 Direct 25 18 
 Indirect 13 13 
 Both 2 0 
The United Kingdom 
Pattern/Evaluation Positive Negative 
Input Neither 6 26 
 Direct 13 138 
 Indirect 14 43 
 Both 3 4 
Throughput Neither 1 16 
 Direct 3 24 
 Indirect 4 15 
 Both 0 0 
Output Neither 19 30 
 Direct 11 29 
 Indirect 10 10 
 Both 1 0 
France 
Pattern/Evaluation Positive Negative 
Input Neither 11 27 
 Direct 20 168 
 Indirect 5 23 
 Both 1 1 
Throughput Neither 5 23 
 Direct 1 28 
 Indirect 1 18 
 Both 0 3 
Output Neither 28 31 
 Direct 15 47 
 Indirect 7 25 
 Both 0 1 
 
 
Word count: 6253 + 950 = 7203 
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